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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLEN J. ELLIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs-
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 870252-CA 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Respondent Board replies to 
Appellant's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari as follows: 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1- Does the Appellant meet the eligibility requirements for a 
Disability Retirement Benefit under either Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28 
or § 49-9a-8? 
2- To what extent may the Legislature modify and substitute 
benefits in a retirement system and apply those modifications and sub-
stitutions to persons who have not met all the conditions precedent to 
receiving a retirement benefit (those persons whose rights have not 
"vested")? 
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OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was filed July 6, 1988 
under Case No. 870252 - CA. See Appendix "A". Appellant's petition 
for rehearing with the Court of Appeals was denied in an order dated 
August 16, 1988. See Appendix "B". 
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
A. Date of Entry of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals -
July 6f 1988. 
B. Date of Entry of Order denying Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing - August 16, 1988. 
C. Respondent files no cross-petition. 
D. The Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2) 
and (5), 78-2a-4 and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND UTAH STATUTES 
1- Article 1, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution. 
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be 
passed." 
2- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-4 - See Argument Point II 
3- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 - See Argument Point II 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case. 
Prior to July 1, 1983, eligibility requirements for public 
employee disability retirement benefits, as well as the benefits them-
selves, were governed under the provisions of the Utah State Retirement 
Act. (Retirement Act) Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-1 et seq. 
On July 1, 1983, a new disability retirement program, "The Utah 
Public Employees' Disability Act" (Disability Act) was implemented and 
governed all covered disabilities which occurred on or after July 1, 
1983. Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-l et seq. 
On February 16, 1987, after hearing Appellant Ellis' request for 
a disability retirement benefit, the retirement board, through its exe-
cutive officer, notified Ellis that ne was not eligible for eitner: (1) 
benefits under the Retirement Act, since his date of disability was in 
1986, three years after the new Disability Act became effective, or (2) 
benefits under the new Disability Act, since Provo City, Appellant's 
employer, had exercised its statutory option to decline coverage under 
the new Disability Act. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. 
Following the retirement board's denial of Appellant's 
administrative appeal, he commenced legal action in the Fourth 
District Court, later changed to Third District Court pursuant to 
a motion made by Respondent. Subsequently, the Third District Court 
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granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and denied Appellant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Appellant then appealed to the Utah State Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed the lower court decision. Appellant subsequently 
filed a Petition for Rehearing with the Court of Appeals, which 
was denied August 16, 1988. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
has resulted from that denial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1- Appellant Ellis was head of the Provo City Attorney's Office. 
On April 28, 1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement. Under 
existing statutory provisions he was not totally disabled. (Opinion 
of Court of Appeals, Appendix "A" Page 1, paragraph 2). 
2- The Utah State Retirement Board, through its executive 
director, notified Ellis on February 16, 1987, that his disability 
application had been denied on the grounds the Legislature had 
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-1 et seq. (1981), with a new plan which was 
optional for political subdivisions such as Provo City. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-9a-l et seq. (1984). Provo City elected not to participate 
and, in any event, Ellis would have been ineligible for a disability 
benefit under the Disability Act because he was not totally disabled. 
(Opinion of Court of Appeals Exhibit "A" Page 1, paragraph 3). He 
would not have been eligible under the Retirement Act because he 
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continued to work for Provo City while seeking disability benefits. 
See also Appendix "C". 
3- Appellant Ellis appealed the retirement board decision to 
the Third District Court. The Respondent Board moved to dismiss on 
the basis of Appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. Appellant moved for Summary Judgment. The Court 
granted Respondent Board's Motion to Dismiss and denied Ellis' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Opinion of Court of Appeals, Page 2, paragraph 
2). 
4- Appellant then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the District Court judgment. (Opinion of Court of Appeals, 
July 6, 1988). 
5- Appellant filed a Petition for Rehearing with the Court of 
Appeals. The Petition for Rehearing was denied August 16, 1988, 
Appendix "B". 
6- Appellant now petitions The Supreme Court of Utah for Writ 
of Certiorari. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI CONTAINS 
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON THEREFOR, AS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court clearly states that 
review by writ of certiorari will only be granted when there are 
special and important reasons for doing so. Rule 43 then indicates 
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the "character of reasons11 that will be considered by the Court. Four 
characters of reasons are specified, but none of these four are cited 
or appear to have been argued by the Appellant and none of them are 
applicable in this case. 
POINT II. SINCE APPELLANT'S DISABILITY OCCURRED IN 1986, 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
DISABILITY ACT, WHICH APPLIES TO ALL DISABILITIES 
OCCURRING ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1983, GOVERN APPELLANT'S 
DISABILITY BENEFITS. APPELLANT IS INELIGIBLE FOR A 
BENEFIT UNDER THAT ACT. 
The provisions of the 1983 Disability Act, which governed the 
disposition of this case in the courts below, provide: 
§ 49-9a-4. All employers participating in the Utah State 
Retirement System may cover their employees under this act. 
Nothing in this act shall require any political subdivision 
or educational institution to be covered by this act. 
§ 49-9a-8. All covered disabilities with a date of disability 
on or after the effective date of this act shall be administered 
under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no event, may 
a disability be covered under both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this 
act. (The effective date of the act was July 1, 1983. Laws of 
Utah 1983, Ch. 223, § 2). 
Appellant claimed disability in 1986. His employer, Provo City, 
had exercised its statutory option to not participate in the disability 
plan offered by the 1983 Disability Act. Yet, despite these facts, 
Appellant asserts, and would have this Court hold, that since the 
Legislature did not expressly repeal the disability benefits offered 
by the Retirement Act under Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28 (1981) when it 
enacted the 1983 Disability Act, that he should be allowed to retire 
under the Retirement Act, even though it is only for those whose 
disabilities commenced prior to July 1, 1983. 
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Tfrfc Court of Appeals understood the ramifications of this disturb-
ing argument and offered a clear analysis of the interrelationship of 
the two disability plans: 
"Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear express 
language provided that two disability retirement 
systems would co-exist in Utah. The earlier 1967 
Retirement Act would continue to cover disabili-
ties commencing before the effective date of the 
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose 
disabilities commenced after the 1983 Disability 
Act became effective would be governed by the 
later Disability Act." (See Opinion, Exhibit 
"A" Page 3, paragraph 3.) 
Thus, the Disability Act governs Appellant's disability retirement 
benefits, and under that Act, Appellant is ineligible for benefits. 
First, Provo City elected to not participate in the plan, as allowed 
by Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-4. Second, even if Provo City had partici-
pated in the plan, Appellant would still be ineligible because ne was 
not "totally disabled" as required by the Act, a fact conceded by 
Appellant in the courts below. (See Opinion, page 1.) 
While not determinative of the outcome of this petition, Respondent 
Board offers some observations on certain allegations made by the 
Appellant in his petition. In his first argument, he argues that the 
repeal of § 49-10-28 has resulted in a windfall to the board "which no 
longer has to pay out anything for disability retirement." This argu-
mentative statement is clearly specious. All disability retirees who 
properly met the requirements of § 49-10-28; i.e., they were disabled 
prior to January 1, 1983, continue to receive disability retirement 
payments from the board from the contributions made to that plan. 
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POINT III. APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFIED ALL THE CONDITIONS 
PRECEDENT TO RECEIVING A DISABILITY RETIREMENT 
BENEFIT. HIS RIGHTS TO THE BENEFIT ARE THEREFORE 
NOT VESTED AND MAY BE REASONABLY AMENDED BY 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION. 
Appellant argues that he has a contractual vested right to a dis-
ability benefit under the pre-1983 law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
49-10-28. But since he was, by his own admission, not disabled in 1983, 
he is in essence arguing that the Legislature had no right to enact 
legislation taking away his right to a disability retirement benefit 
under the Retirement Act. 
There is no question that if Appellant had met all the conditions 
for obtaining a disability retirement benefit under the Retirement Act, 
his retirement would have contractually "vested11, and this case would 
have been resolved under Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 at the administrative 
level. But Appellant never did meet all the conditions for obtaining 
the disability benefit under the Retirement Act, i.e., his disability 
did not commence prior to July 1, 1983, and the date of the commencement 
of disability is a condition for determining a benefit. 
The Court of Appeals in this case offers an interesting analysis 
of the two conflicting lines of authority governing the rights of 
employees under retirement systems. Utah numbers itself among those 
states which adhere to the contractual line of authority. Beginning 
with Driggs v. Utah Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d 
657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when an 
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employee has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving his bene-
fits, then the employee has a "vested right" in his benefits as provided 
by law at the time of retirement and subsequent legislative enactments 
cannot reduce or diminish that benefit. See Hansen v. Public Employees 
Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 
597 (1952); Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers1 Retirement 
Commission, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952). 
Most recently, this Court had the opportunity to uphold these 
principles in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, (No. 20734, filed 
September 19, 1988) wherein the Court concluded an analysis of the 
Legislature's right to modify pension statutes of retired members of 
the Public Safety Retirement System, Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1 et seq. 
(Supp. 1985), with the following statement: 
"The State may not rescind or modify its 
offer after it has been accepted and all 
conditions have been satisfied. ld^ at 8. 
Utah law is thus settled on this issue. Since Appellant did not 
satisfy all the conditions precedent for a disability benefit under the 
Retirement Act, his rights are not vested. The Legislature is thus 
permitted to modify, or as is the case here, provide a substantial 
substitute for, the disability benefits under the Retirement Act, and 
apply its provisions to Appellant and all others similarly situated. 
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SUMMARY 
There are no new questions of law to be decided in this case. The 
Court of Appeals has issued an opinion which is consistent with well 
established precedent in this jurisdiction. 
Appellant has no right to a disability benefit under either Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-10-28, or § 49-9a-8, since his rights are not vested 
in the Retirement Act and he does not meet the eligibility require-
ments of the Disability Act. 
Appellant has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted. 
M 
MarH 
Sta 
aJ^^)r\ 
A. Madsen, Attorney for 
Defqndant/Respondenjb Utah 
e Retirement Board 
^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
JM^ 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed .a"true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Glen J. Ellis, Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 60 East 100 South, Suite 102, P. 0. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 
84603 and delivered 10 copies to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
on this " 7 ^ day of October, 1988. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
JUL "8 1988 
UTAH STATE LAW UWARY 
Glen J. Ellis, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v* 
Utah State Retirement Board, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870252-CA 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
LED 
Timothy \\. Shoa 
Cj/rk of the Court 
ah Coun of Appeals 
Plaintiff Ellis appeals from the district court's 
decision affirming an administrative denial of his application 
for disability retirement benefits. Ellis' main contention is 
that the lower court erred in upholding the administrative 
ruling that the 1983 Utah Disability Act rather than the 1967 
Utah State Retirement Act governed his claim for disability 
benefits. We affirm the district court's judgment. 
Ellis was the head of the Provo City Attorney's Office 
for over 20 years. According to Ellis' attending physician, 
Ellis suffered numerous medical conditions stemming from the 
stressful nature of his employment. Consequently, on April 28, 
1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement benefits. He was 
not totally disabled but, rather, sought less stressful legal 
employment. 
The Utah State Retirement Board denied Ellis' application 
for disability retirement benefits finding the Legislature 
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits, 
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981), with an optional 
plan in 1983, s^e Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984), in 
which Provo elected not to participate and under which, in any 
event, Ellis would not have qualified because he was not 
totally disabled. 
Ellis objected to the administrative denial of benefits 
and sought a formal hearing before the Board. In a hearing 
held in February 1987, the Board listened to Ellis and then 
requested Ellis to leave the room so the Board could consider 
his application. The Board denied Ellis' application for 
benefits. -In response, Ellis filed a complaint in district 
court seeking a review of the Board's decision. He claimed 
that if the Board was correct in finding the Legislature 
repealed the retirement plan under which he sought benefits, 
then this repeal was unconstitutional. Ellis also challenged 
the procedure of the Retirement Board claiming the Board failed 
to comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and the 
Open and Public Meetings Act. 
The Board moved to dismiss Ellis' complaint asserting it 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Ellis moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of 
law, the 1983 enactment of the long-term disability act did not 
repeal the retirement plan under which he sought benefits. The 
court granted the Board's motion to dismiss and denied Ellis' 
motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued. 
I. 
At the outset, we must determine whether the Legislature 
replaced the 1967 retirement program under which Ellis sought 
and qualified for disability benefits. Since this issue raises 
a question of special law, see Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983), we must 
determine whether the Board's decision falls within the limits 
of reasonableness or rationality. Id. 
Our analysis of whether the Legislature replaced the 
earlier retirement program is best understood against the 
background of the relevant statutory history. Between July 1, 
1967, and June 30, 1983, state retirement benefits were 
governed by the Utah State Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981). Section 49-10-28 of the Retirement 
Act provided that a state employee was entitled to disability 
benefits provided the employee had worked at least 10 years for 
the state and a medical examination determined that the 
employee was "physically or mentally incapable of performance 
of the usual duties of his employment and should be retired and 
the administrator so recommends to the board." 
On March 10, 1983, the Legislature enacted the Utah 
Public Employees' Disability Act. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 223, § 1 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984)). The 
Legislature did not expressly repeal the Utah State Retirement 
Act when it enacted the Disability Act; however, the 
Legislature clearly provided that the Disability Act would 
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cover all disabilities with a date of disability on or after 
the effective date of the Act, namely July 1, 1983. 1983 Utah 
Laws ch. 223,. § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 (1984). Provisions 
of the Disability Act relevant to the instant case, with our 
emphasis added, provide: 
section 49-9a-4: All employers 
participating in the Utah state retirement 
system may cover their employees under this 
act. Nothing in this act shall require any 
political subdivision or educational 
institution to be covered by this act. 
section 49-9a-8: All covered disabilities 
with a date of disability on or after the 
effective d9te of this get shgii be 
administered under this act. Disabilities 
commencing before the effective date of this 
act shall be administered under the 
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no 
event, may a disability be covered under 
both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act. 
Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear, express language 
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist 
in Utah. The earlier 1967 Retirement Act would continue to 
cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the 
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose disabilities 
commenced after the 1983 Disability Act became effective would 
be governed by the later Disability Act. 
In order to receive disability benefits under the 
Disability Act, the employee must be totally disabled. 
"Totally disabled" is defined by the Disability Act to mean 
"complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation which 
is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training 
and experience." Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-3(10) (1984).1 The 
effective date of the Disability Act was July 1, 1983. 1983 
Utah Laws ch, 223, § 2. After July 1, 1983, the Retirement 
Board refused to accept contributions for the Chapter 10, Title 
49 fund. 
1. Ellis concedes he is not "totally disabled" as defined by 
the Disability Act and, therefore, does not qualify for 
disability benefits under this statutory scheme. 
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On appeal, Ellis contends the Legislature did not 
impliedly repeal the Utah State Retirement Act when it 
subsequently^, enacted the Disability Act. We agree that the 
Legislature did not impliedly repeal the Retirement Act but, 
rather, by clear language, it expressly replaced the Retirement 
Act with the Disability Act for disability retirements 
commencing after the Disability Act's effective date* 
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of 
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not 
favored and are found only if there is a manifest inconsistency 
or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. State v. 
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980). Subsequently enacted 
statutes relating to the same subject matter as previous 
statutes are, if possible, to be construed so as to make the 
later enactments harmonious with the former provisions. Stahl 
v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). 
Nonetheless, 
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be 
maintained without the abrogation of a 
previous law, a repeal by implication of 
previous legislation . . . is readily found 
in the terms of the later enactment. It is 
the necessary effect of the later enactment 
construed in the light of the existing law 
that ultimately determines an implied 
repeal. . . . [W]here a conflict is readily 
seen by an application of the later 
enactment in accord with [the legislative] 
intent, it is clear that the later enactment 
is intended to supersede the existing law. 
1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332 
(4th ed. 1985). This is so because when there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior 
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision 
is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the 
Legislature. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 
1983). 
The foregoing authority, however, is inapplicable as we 
are persuaded the Legislature clearly and expressly provided 
that the Utah State Retirement Act would continue to govern 
disabilities arising before July 1, 1983, the effective date of 
the Disability Act, but all those disability retirements 
occurring thereafter would be governed by the Disability Act. 
Therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the 
Retirement Act and the Disability Act as the two acts are 
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mutually exclusive, A disability is governed by one statutory 
act or the other/ but not both. A consistent body of law :i 5 
maintained and the Disability Act does not abrogate the 
Retirement Act, 
The date of EI lis' di^aBiiity it> AIM 11 z6r IJOU, 1 1 
after July 1, 1983, which is the effective date of the 
Disability Act. Consequently, the Disability Act govern 
Ellis* disability retirement benefits 
mentioned,, supra Note 1, Ellis is not 
required by the Disability Act. Thei 
entitled to disability benefi ts und*-*« 
scheme. 
Huwever, as previuti. 
illy disabled" as 
1 i"# Ellis is not 
qoverri i nq s t at n ' u " 
ly 
Notwithstanding our holding that Ellis does not qualify 
for benefits under either retirement scheme/ we must ' -
determine whether the Legislature's replacement of t.\ 
Retirement Act with the Disability Act unconstitutionally 
deprived Ellis of vested contractual rights. Ellis con*- r 
that if the Disability Act governs his eligibility for 
disability retirement benefits, then he was unconstitutionally 
denied his vested contractual rights to an earned disability 
pension. Under Utah law, Ellis' argument is without mer!^, 
•e line o:. a*;* 
gratuity in w 
There are 
retired employee 
retirement plan is 
vested rights and/ 
employer's option 
111. 430, 107 N.E.2d ,„. 
compulsory participation .ui-.c. 
recipients because statutes arte 
the sovereign power of the scate 
contracts between the participant 
State Bd. of Retirement, 331 M,.s-
(holding that an employee had 
were infringed by the repeal o. 
employee's eligibility for retir 
v. Trammel1, 129 Tex. 150, 1 S. 
employee has no vested ri< ^ 
*^ holds that a 
recipient has no 
xj terminable at the 
Board of Trustees, 412 
plans which ma nda t e 
^hts upon 
nef its A t -> * upon 
u^L in the nature of 
3 state); Roach v. 
.- N.E.2d 850 (1954) 
rights to pension which 
en statute despite 
LJ repeal); Dallas 
(1937) (put lie 
~y pension^ 
The other line of authority adheres to the contractual 
view which reasons that once a public employee has fulfilled 
all the conditions precedent to receiving retirement benefits, 
the employee has certain vested rights which cannot 1e Impaired 
by subsequent administrative or legislative enactments. See, 
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz, 109, 402 P,2d 541 (1965) 
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(right to public pension vests upon acceptance of public 
employment and laws of state are part of every contract); Betts 
v. Board of Admin, of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Svs., 21 
Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614 (1978) (public 
employee's pension constitutes an element of compensation, and 
a vested contractual right: to pension accrues upon acceptance 
of employment); In re State Employees' Pension Plan, 364 A.2d 
1228 (Del, 1976) (vested contractual rights exist under statP 
pension law for those public employees who have fulfilled 
eligibility requirements); Miles v. Tennessee Consolidated 
Retirement Sys. , 548 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1977) (public employ— 
has contractual right to pension benefits), Under the 
contractual view, state legislatures may reasonably alter the 
terms or modify the retirement system to improve it or ke<^ 
on a sound basis prior to retirement for purposes of 
maintaining the integrity of the system. See, e.g., Bettb 
P.2d at 617. Once the retirement benefits have vested, 
however, the Legislature can modify the plan only upon a 
showing that a vital state interest will be protected, Miles, 
548 S.W.2d at 305, and only where a substantial substitute is 
provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained. 
Newcombe v. Qgden City Public School Teacher's Retirement 
Comm'n, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 948 (1952), 
Utah adheres to the contractual line of authority. In 
Driqqs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., , 105 Utah 417 1 -J ,„•" 
P.2d 657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an 
employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance awarded for 
appreciation of past services has no vested rights in the 
allowance and it is terminable at w i] ] ici at 659.. On the 
other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite 
contributions and had satisfied all conditions precedent to h:i s 
benefits, then the employee had a "vested right" in his 
retirement benefits as provided by the statute at the time of 
his retirement and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the 
amount of benefits to which the employee was entitled... L^. at 
663-64. 
Since Driqqs, our supreme court, has consistently held 
tl lat the employee has this vested contractual right only when 
he has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving the 
benefit,, i e., he has attained retirement age* nas been 
medically disabled. See Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement 
Svs. Bd. of Admin., ,,2 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 597 (1952); 
Newcombe v. Qgden City Public School Teachers' Retirement 
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Comm'n, ] 23 Utah 503, 243 P 2d 941 94 7 (19 52) 2 
Based "Upon the foregoing authority,, we are persuaded 
Ellis was not deprived of vested contractual benefits because 
he failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to his disability 
retirement benefits, namely Ellis had not become disabled and 
retired before the Legislature enacted the Disability Act. 
Consequently, he was not enti tli ed to benefi ts under the 
governing Disability Act. 
I. 
Ellis further contends * . Retirement Board violated the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act J by failing to comply with rule 
making procedures when it determined the Retirement Act had 
been replaced by the Disability Act in deciding Ellis* 
eligibility for disability benefits. Ellis contends that such 
a determination was, in effect, a policy determination subject 
to adequate advance notice t~ ? - -if — cted parties. 
2, We note, howev*;..-; that Driggs was slightly modified ir. 
Newcombe. In Newcombe, the court held a statute which dist 
a statutory pension system invalid as to retired employees 
Newcombe, 243 P.2d at 948. In dictum, however, the court 
acknowledged that had the Legislature "attempted to make c h a n t s 
in local retirement systems for the purpose of strengthening 
them, there would be no difficulty in finding authority to 
support such action." id. at 946. To support this dictum, the 
court relied on several cases holding that vested rights of 
retired employees are not impaired by a reduction in the amount 
of the pension payments pursuant to statutes enacted subsequent 
to retirement, provided the purpose of such statutes is to 
render the retirement pension system actuarially sound 
3. The Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utal i Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46a«l to -15 (1986), was significantly revised and amended 
in 1987, after the commencement of this action. Accordingly, 
our analysis focuses on the administrative provisions in effect 
at the time of Ellis' hearing before the Retirement Board. 
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opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment.4 
Any agency subject to the Administrative Rulemaking Act 
promulgating a rule must follow the procedures specified. See 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) 
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act). The Administrative Rulemaking 
Act requires rule making whenever "agency actions affect a 
class of persons" and defines a rule as Ma statement made by an 
agency that applies to a general class of persons, rather than 
specific persons . . . [which] implements or interprets policy 
made by statute . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-(3)(a), 
-2(8) (1986).5 
The critical question, therefore, is whether the 
Retirement Board's decision to deny Ellis disability retirement 
benefits based upon its interpretation of the language of the 
Disability Act amounted to a rule within the meaning of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. "We acknowledge that there is a 
variance of opinion on when an agency is engaged in rule making 
and must follow formal rule making procedures, and when an 
agency may legitimately proceed by way of adjudication." 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. See generally 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979). "Many rules 
are the product of rulemaking, and rulemaking is the part of 
the administrative process that resembles a legislature's 
enactment of a statute. An order is the product of 
adjudication, and adjudication is the part of the 
4. The Retirement Board contends that Ellis did not raise the 
applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking Act below and, 
therefore, is precluded from raising this issue for the first time 
on appeal. We disagree. The record indicates that Ellis raised 
this issue not only in his amended complaint but also in his 
motion for summary judgment. 
5. The Retirement Board argues that it is exempt from the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act because it is a "political 
subdivision." Since the commencement of this action, the Utah 
State Retirement Act was amended and the Legislature decreed that 
the Board "shall voluntarily comply" with the provisions of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-201(4) 
(1987). This new language implies that during the period of time 
at issue here the Board may indeed have been exempt from the Act's 
coverage. But see Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 86-16 
(June 4, 1986), wherein Utah's Attorney General concludes that the 
Retirement Board was required to comply with the requirements of 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Inasmuch as we conclude that 
the Board, in any event, complied with the Act, we need not decide 
whether it was required to do so. 
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administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a 
case." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2, at 4 (2d 
ed. 1979). 
In Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the definition of 
"rule" contained in the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act.6 In Williams, the 
petitioners charged the Public Service Commission with failure 
to follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it 
did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way mobile telephone 
paging services. The supreme court held that the Commission's 
letter stating that no certificate of public convenience and 
necessity was required constituted a "rule" and, consequently, 
the Commission, when reaching this determination, should have 
followed the rule making procedures. !£. at 776. The court 
relied on three factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the 
Commission's decision was generally applicable. Second, the 
letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's statutory 
regulatory powers, thus interpreting the law within the meaning 
of the Act. Finally, in so acting, the Commission made a 
"change in clear law" by reversing its long-settled position 
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announcing a 
fundamental policy change. I£. 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the Retirement Board 
was not engaged in rule making and, therefore, did not have to 
adhere to rule making procedural requirements. Rather, the 
Board was merely applying the explicit statutory language of the 
Disability Act to the facts of Ellis' case. The explicit 
language of the Disability Act provides that that Act, not the 
Retirement Act, governs all disabilities with a date of 
disability after July 1, 1983. Ellis' date of disability is 
April 26, 1986. This administrative process does not resemble 
the Legislature's enactment of a statute. On the contrary, the 
administrative process examined here resembles a court's 
decision applying explicit statutory language. The only policy 
decision which was generally applicable was made by the 
Legislature in its enactment of the Disability Act. The change 
in clear law in this instance was promulgated by the 
Legislature, not the Retirement Board. Therefore, the 
Retirement Board was not compelled to follow the rule making 
procedures of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
6. The court stated that its conclusion would not be any 
different had the court been called upon to interpret the 
definition of "rule" within the meaning of the subsequently 
enacted Administrative Rulemaking Act. Williams, 720 P.2d at 
775 n.7. 
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IV. 
The final issue we address is whether the Retirement Board 
violated the^Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981), when it requested Ellis to leave the 
room while it deliberated his appeal from the administrative 
denial of benefits. 
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that every 
"meeting" of a Mpublic body" be open to the public. As used in 
this Act, "public body" means "any administrative, advisory, 
executive or legislative body of the state or its political 
subdivisions which consists of two or more persons that expends, 
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue and 
which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding 
the public's business." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) (1981). 
We are persuaded that the Open and Public Meetings Act is 
not applicable to the Retirement Board. First, the Utah State 
Retirement Fund is administered as a common trust fund and not 
supported by tax revenue. Second, the Retirement Board is not 
vested with authority to make decisions regarding the public's 
business. The Board administers funds for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries and not for the public at large. Hansen v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982). When 
Hansen was decided, "[s]ome 80 percent of the beneficiaries 
[were] not state employees, but employees of municipalities or 
counties." I£. "No state funds [were] appropriated to meet any 
administrative costs." id. Ellis' argument that the Board 
acted contrary to the Open and Public Meetings Act is without 
merit. 
$Uc&l 
Aff irmed. 
a 
J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 
WE COtJCUR: 
r/" / 
Pam^raTTXGreenwood, Judge 
<4<di-j>e 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Glen J. Ellis, 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
v. 
Utah- State Retirement Board, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
ORDER 
No. 870252-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing 
filed by the appellant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 16th day of August, 1988. 
FOR THE COURT: 
lary T./Ndonan 
ClerkNm:' the Court 
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801)355-3884 
BERT D. HUNSAKER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
February 16, 1987 
Mr. Glen J. Ellis 
P. 0, Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
REGISTERED MAIL 
Dear Mr. Ellis: 
This letter is written confirmation of the action taken by the Utah 
State Retirement Board regarding your appeal of the administrative 
denial of your disability retirement application. 
The Board voted to deny your request, based on advice of legal 
counsel and the interpretation of section 49-9a-a, enacted in 1983 by 
the Utah Legislature, which it feels specifically negates the disability 
provisions of section 49-10, U.C.A., as amended. 
As was explained to you at the hearing, Provo City elected not to 
participate in the disability program provided in 49-9a, and chose to 
provide its own program. Disability coverage of Provo City under 
any programs by the State terminated when Provo chose to exclude the 
benefits of 49-9a from its employees and provide another disability 
program. It would appear from these facts that the real issue here is 
one with Provo City and not the Utah State Retirement Board. 
If I may provide any further information I shall be happy to do so. 
Yours sincerely, 
Bert D. Hunsaker 
Executive Director 
BDH:whm 
/t^JS^/A 1/ County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
FILE NO. CJUfi-yiplJ-
( • PARTIES PRESENT) C O U N S E L (,* COUNSEL PRESENT) 
Jl(U jp \9.J^ ^fjrNux. finn/LAj J{< IW IMLA-
VAL/L. 
1 lh-k [Hdbu nJJjLAvrmrtt RBCLVL ir /^iL nwA**^ 
—s|pma. 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAJUFF 
HON. A/1/Lv\g. tJ^, 7)mi? 
DATE: r W 1, M l 
JUOGE 
g rfjQiJL*" * WcJi k AJA<<?AS^ K ^ i A A-£\ \^/ SyL/ i 
>.) 1 / H P ^ X ^ V U 
£JL ,g?1^V, c- ~TU<? ^ i LAA^XJZ^T ( ^ l o o 
C Sr^n^iA si) UDOL tL Af CV7» 
Ai^Jftk l\*si h>&*A < 4 t/TX . * y ) , < ^ U A '^ Tv>. 
W -Hi^ _ v x ^ ^ ^ \lAAit C1^3^) '^-'^' ^ 2 2 i l u : 
^Ui . iy 'v i ^ ^ x ^ y d A /i,lArsj~ -ff.„ . ^£ArArC*^>, Mj?f &k-
M^ l/Lf ^C 
.'AJ (iA 
TV A /7^A M"Hr^ 
•^p aCAA/ l*-^/t/\bi/V . vTL^^AL^^-
J ^ l ^ v ^ 
^ • ^ 7 
